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Abstract 
We apply a novel decomposition of panel data on individual incomes in 30 countries and find the US 
is exceptional in its increases of income risk over the last decades. Income risk is decomposed into 
long-run inequality, intertemporal variability around individual-specific growth rates (volatility), and 
variation in individual-specific growth rates (mobility risk) using a decomposable generalized entropy 
measure. We also measure the degree to which the government tax and transfer system lowers long-
run inequality, intertemporal variation, and mobility risk, and again the US is exceptional, with the tax 
and transfer system lowering the risk of net income less in the US than in other developed countries 
we examine. We further find that growth rates are positively associated with long-run mean incomes 
in most countries, implying growth tends not to be pro-poor, and that volatility tends to be higher for 
those with higher long-run mean incomes, so that form of risk may be progressively distributed. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a renewed interest in recent years in income inequality, but also in economic 
mobility (both moving up and moving down), and income volatility or intertemporal variability 
risk – the year-to-year variations in the income that families may or may not be able to smooth 
over. However, a unified approach to measuring these phenomena has proved elusive. We use an 
aggregate measure of income risk (Nichols 2008, 2010) for incomes measured over both people 
and time. The aggregate measure can be de-composed into an inequality component measuring 
the dispersion in mean incomes, a volatility component measuring the average dispersion of the 
fluctuations about person-specific trends, and a mobility risk component measuring the 
dispersion of person-specific trends. We apply this de-composition to panel data from 30 
different countries to compare and characterise levels of, and trends in, inequality, volatility 
(intertemporal variability around trend), and mobility risk (variation in individual trends). We 
also examine the regressivity of income growth in these data. 
2. Background 
Inequality at a point in time is of little intrinsic interest if incomes are changing rapidly over 
time; it is long-run income inequality that reflects the disparities of interest. Incomes may be 
changing due to short-lived transitory shocks, or more permanent changes, but either kind of 
change induces greater volatility in the income stream and greater relative
1
 mobility. Some view 
these changes as mitigating inequality (frequently citing Schumpeter 1955 or Friedman 1962), 
but if these changes reflect income risk, they lower the well-being for any risk-averse person, 
holding constant the mean level of income. This paper inclines towards the latter viewpoint, 
characterising the observed changes in income as reflecting underlying risk. 
Greater absolute mobility, or higher average growth in real incomes, may change our 
interpretation of increasing inequality or variability in incomes. A doubling of real incomes may 
make us less worried about increasing trends in volatility combined with constant relative 
mobility and increasing inequality, though the change in measured (scale-invariant) inequality 
due to a doubling of incomes is nil. In this paper, we will focus exclusively on measuring 
                                                
1
  Growth in incomes relative to average growth is called “relative mobility” so both volatility and mobility may 
result in reranking of individuals within the income distribution in any one period or over time. 
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inequality, volatility (intertemporal variability around trend), and mobility; we will not 
characterise their welfare consequences.
2
 However, we will discuss the connections between 
higher incomes, and higher average growth in real incomes, and the measured riskiness of 
incomes. 
Inequality in observed incomes is not inequality in well-being, or important outcomes such 
as mortality rates. Even if we regard income
3
 as a valid measure of well-being, inequality of 
observed incomes is a poor measure of inequality of income distributions. Measured inequality is 
positive when all incomes are drawn from the same distribution. That is, if every individual in 
society has income in every period that is a random draw from the same distribution (implying 
equality of opportunity) the inequality of observed outcomes across individuals will be non-zero, 
and overstate inequality of opportunity. 
On the other hand, inequality estimates in survey data are typically biased downward. Breunig 
(2001) shows that the bias of the GE2 estimator
4
 (estimating half the squared co-efficient of 
variation, or the general entropy measure with parameter 2), used in the rest of this paper, has the 
sign of three times the co-efficient of variation (CV) less twice the population skewness. So for 
income distributions that exhibit large positive skew, the bias of the GE2 estimator is usually 
negative. This property also holds if we imagine having population data on income and 
estimating an inequality parameter for the super-population, or family of populations from which 
the current population data are drawn. So if the inequality of incomes in the hypothetical 
population or super-population is positive, we will typically under-estimate this positive level of 
inequality. 
Thus there may be two offsetting biases: variation in observed outcomes may overstate 
variation in potential outcomes, but measured variation in observed outcomes may understate 
potential variation in observed outcomes. In other words, population inequality (of outcomes) 
                                                
2
  See, for example, Atkinson (1970) and Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) for connections to social welfare; we 
follow the lead of Sen (1973) in pursuing descriptive measures. 
3
  Many authors have pointed out that well-being is multidimensional and cannot be characterized using a simple 
scalar variable like observed income; see, for example, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Maasoumi (1986), 
Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), and Osberg and Sharpe (2005). 
4
  The GE2, or variance divided by twice the squared mean, has desirable properties described by, e.g., Shorrocks 
(1984). On its bias and MSE, see also Breunig and Hutchinson (2008). On alternatives to GE2, see, e.g., 
Atkinson (1970), Blackorby et al. (1981), Cowell (1995, 2000). 
 3 
may overstate inequality of opportunity, but sample inequality may understate population 
inequality. However, these biases are unavoidable, and there is good reason to think they are 
small given a large sample over many years. 
Strictly speaking, volatility is also never observed. As the volatility of share prices is 
estimated using historical data on changes in price, so income volatility is often measured as 
variation in income over time. However, this reflects behavioural changes, measurement error, 
and both short-term and long-term real changes in income. Some authors attempt to de-compose 
variability of income over time into permanent and transitory shocks, but this requires specifying 
a model of income dynamics that applies to all individuals (see, e.g., Lillard and Weiss 1978, 
Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995, Baker 1997). It is unlikely that such a model would survive 
empirical tests of its restrictions in a more flexible model that nests it (for example by treating 
the additional implications of the model not strictly required to identify parameters as over-
identifying restrictions in a Generalised Method of Moments framework). In short, income 
exhibits individual heterogeneity in levels and growth rates which are not independent of the 
history of income levels and gains. In contrast, the approach adopted in this paper imposes no 
distributional assumptions on income at a point in time or on income growth (though linear 
trends are measured, these are conceived as short-run approximations to arbitrary individual-
specific paths of income over time). 
Mobility has been defined in many different ways, and the term encompasses many different 
concepts, such as relative and absolute mobility, or structural and exchange mobility.
5
 One 
measure of mobility (Shorrocks 1978a; Fields 2007) depends on the reduction in inequality due 
to averaging or summing individual incomes across time. This definition implicitly assumes that 
the sum (or average) of income is the key factor in determining well-being, and that the effects of 
variation in income around the mean have negligible welfare consequences. Other definitions of 
mobility rely on transition matrices between states (Shorrocks 1978b; Geweke et al. 1986; 
Alcalde-Unzu et al. 2006), but these founder on several well-known difficulties associated with 
transition matrices. For example, when using transition matrices, the definition of the categories 
(e.g., quintiles or deciles) that characterise states will affect the results. As another example, the 
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  Fields and Ok (1999) offer a review of this broad field of research. Benabou and Ok (2001) define desirable 
mobility as progressive income growth and Mazumder (2008) attempts to measure only upward mobility. 
 4 
current state is typically not a sufficient statistic for transition probabilities as is required for a 
Markov process (meaning that the transition matrix for any given pair of periods does not fully 
characterize the process). 
3. Methods 
Inequality and volatility are always characterised as a measure of dispersion, or variability, of a 
distribution. The overarching idea of the method is that we want to measure variability in income 
using panel data, observations both across individuals and across time. Imagine measuring 
income of three individuals a, b, and c for three years 1, 2, and 3. We can arrange the 
observations first by time: 
| a1 b1 c1| a2 b2 c2 | a3 b3 c3 | 
or first by individual: 
| a1 a2 a3 | b1 b2 b3 | c1 c2 c3 | 
which suggests two de-compositions by group, in which the group is defined by a time index t or 
alternatively by an individual index i. The natural choice (Shorrocks 1984) of inequality measure 
for de-compositions by group is the generalised entropy measure GE2, equal to half the squared 
co-efficient of variation. 
Suppose we observe L people,
6
 indexed by i running from 1 to L, observed at T points in 
time, for N=LT observations on income y. Consider first a de-composition by population sub-
group following Shorrocks (1984) in which the population is all person-years, and sub-groups 
are people: 
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in which iy  indicates the within-person sample mean of income over all the time periods 
observed, and y  is the sample mean of income over all persons and time periods. The first term 
Bi represents variation across individuals in their mean income over some time period of T years, 
i.e., T-year inequality. The second term Wi represents variation of individual income around 
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  Another choice of analysis unit is of course possible, for example, family or household, but these are much less 
convenient when dealing with panel data, since composition may change over time. 
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mean income. Correcting for estimation error in individual-specific means as in Nichols (2008), 
the revised de-composition can be written as: 
GE2 = Bi −
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These components are inequality in individual-specific mean incomes over time (I) and 
variance of deviations over time around the individual-specific means (D). 
We can further de-compose the second term D (“deviations”) into a component due to 
individual trends in income, and a component due to variations around the trend. This is most 
intuitively understood by imagining regressing individual income on an individual-specific time 
trend and a constant, and letting the sum of squared residuals be defined as the component due to 
variations around the trend. The difference between the second term D and the mean over 
individuals of the individual-specific sum of squared residuals (or variation in de-trended and de-
meaned income) is the individual-specific variance of predicted income over T years, which is 
proportional
7
 to the mean across the individuals of the squared individual-specific trend (all 
divided by twice mean income squared). 
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or 
( ) MVIMMDIGE ++=+−+=2 . 
As above, I stands for “inequality”, meaning long-run inequality. We call the terms V for 
“volatility” and M for “mobility risk”, though, of course, other measures of these concepts are 
also possible. V now captures squared deviations around the linear individual-specific trend in 
income. M measures the extent to which incomes grow or fall over time; it represents the 
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  Specifically, the variance of predicted values is the squared growth rate times the variance of the time index, 
where the time index t is always defined so that it has mean zero, so that the constant term measures mean 
income. 
 6 
expected squared trend in incomes. We can also additively de-compose this into components 
which are proportional to the variance of the trends and the expected trend squared. Write: 
ARVIMVIGE +++=++=2 . 
In which R is “relative mobility risk” and A is “absolute mobility risk” (proportional to the 
squared mean of the estimated trends across all individuals, a constant). R measures how much 
incomes differentially grow or fall over time, or the dispersion of individual-specific trends in 
income; if T=5, this measure is simply twice the variance of trends. If everyone experienced the 
same average income growth over time (i.e. ri=E(ri) for all i), then R=0. Thus, R actually 
measures “relative mobility risk” or the variance of individual growth rates in income. This is not 
related per se to mean growth rates of income (level of absolute mobility), nor the covariance of 
growth rates with mean levels of income (distinguishing pro-rich or pro-poor growth). However, 
term A is negligible in all the estimates presented here, since it is the squared mean across 
individuals of individual-specific growth rates in income divided by mean income squared and is 
therefore very small relative to R and would not be visible on a graph of trends over time. 
Estimating linear growth rates in individual incomes even over short time periods is not 
completely uncontroversial. Often researchers assume a constant percentage rate of growth in 
incomes over time, or regress log income on time. This assumption does not match the empirical 
distribution of income growth, however, and drops any observations with zero or negative 
income in a period (which limits the sample to those with lower variation over time). 
We can embed the above calculations in a regression framework using panel data by writing a 
fixed-effects model with individual-specific linear time trends: 
itiiit etruy ++=  
in which ui is an individual fixed effect, ri is an individual growth rate, and eit is the idiosyncratic 
error. We then estimate I by the variance of estimated fixed effects (with or without the 
adjustment for estimation error), V as the mean squared residual from the regression (plus the 
adjustment), and R as the variance of predicted values, measuring, in essence, the variance of the 
co-efficients on t. These are all to be divided by twice mean income in the sample to obtain GE2 
measures. 
 7 
Note that this measure does not characterise the progressivity of income growth or the change 
in income inequality over the period of T years. Studying successive T-year periods, we can de-
compose changes in inequality, volatility, and mobility across periods. However, a 
straightforward set of measures of change within the T-year period involves the correlation of the 
estimates of the individual-specific mean of income ui with individual-specific volatility var(eit2) 
and individual-specific mobility ri. To the extent that the individual mean level of income ui is 
correlated with the individual volatility var(eit2), we can say that idiosyncratic risk is 
progressively distributed, suggesting that individuals may be making a risk-return trade-off (or, 
possibly, much volatility may be regarded as positive shocks relative to baseline income). To the 
extent that the mean level of income ui is correlated with mobility, ri income growth can be said 
to be pro-rich, and, in that case, income inequality is rising during the T-year period. 
To measure T-year inequality, volatility, and mobility, we need only T years of data on each 
individual in a survey (and to use weighted means, instead of the unweighted means in the 
previous formulas). For example, we can use five years from a longer panel and measure 5-year 
inequality as the inequality across individuals in 5-year averages of income. But this would say 
nothing about the trend in inequality. 
If we want to measure trends in inequality, volatility, and mobility, we must have a much 
longer panel. Given a panel of a specific fixed length, for example 2T years of panel data, we can 
imagine computing a single 2T-year measure of inequality and other components using a very 
small balanced panel (only for those individuals observed in every survey year), or using the first 
T years to construct one estimate and the second non-overlapping period of T years (beginning in 
year T+1 and running to year 2T) to construct another estimate. Changes in T-year inequality, 
volatility, and mobility are then immediately apparent. More generally, with 2T years of data, we 
can construct T+1 estimates, for each period of T contiguous years. 
4. Data 
We rely on a variety of national and international panel data to estimate income inequality, 
volatility, and mobility risk.
8
 For the United States, we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
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  This manuscript makes use of several licensed data-sets that require the following disclaimers: (i) We employ 
EU-SILC data (European Commission, Eurostat), cross sectional files from 2006 (rev. 03-10) and 2008 (rev. 03-
 8 
(PSID) for survey years 1970 to 2009 (income years 1969 to 2008). Because the PSID moved to 
a biennial survey in 1997, it makes sense to exclude every other year in earlier years as well, so 
that the concepts are the same in every year. A T-year estimate then covers 2T-1 calendar years, 
due to skipping every other calendar year in retrieving T years of data. Thus, with data from 
1970 to 2009, we can, for example, construct 5-year estimates from 1978 (using 1970, 1972, 
1974, 1976, and 1978 data and assigning estimates to the last year of data used) to 2009 (using 
2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 data), with gaps in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003. 
For Australia (Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia – HILDA, 2001 to 
2008), Canada (Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics - SLID), Germany (German 
Socio-Economic Panel – SOEP, 1984 to 2008), South Korea (Korea Labour and Income Panel 
Study – KLIPS, 1998 to 2007), Switzerland (Swiss Household Panel – SHP, 1999-2008), and the 
United Kingdom (British Household Panel Study – BHPS, 1991 to 2007) we rely on national 
panel data that have been made comparable in the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF).
9
 
We rely on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC, ~2004-
2007) for data on Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain.
10
 With the exception of 
Luxembourg, the SILC panels have a maximum length of 4 years. 
                                                                                                                                                       
11), made available to Rehm by the European University Institute. Eurostat has no responsibility for the results 
and conclusions of this article. (ii) This article uses the HILDA-CNEF dataset, an equivalised subset of data from 
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey provided through the CNEF project 
at Cornell University. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department 
of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) and is managed by the 
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The findings and views 
reported in this article, however, are those of the authors and should not be attributed to FaHCSIA, the 
Melbourne Institute or Cornell University. (iii) This study has been realized using the data collected by the Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP) [made available via the CNEF project at Cornell], which is based at the Swiss Centre of 
Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS. The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. 
9
  For the UK, Germany, and Switzerland, we have access to the original data sources. For the sake of 
comparability, however, we will rely on the CNEF. 
10
  We do not use the SILC data for Germany and the UK, since we take them from the CNEF.  
 9 
We construct two main concepts of family income: market income (gross income) and 
disposable income (net income), adjusted for family size.
11
 The calculation of gross and net 
income varies somewhat across our data-sources. 
In the PSID, gross income includes labour and property income, and excludes employer-
provided DB pension benefits, Social Security and other social insurance payments 
(unemployment and worker’s compensation), the cash value of means-tested transfers and cash-
equivalent in-kind benefits (e.g., food stamps). Gross income does not include tax liabilities. Net 
income adds in the excluded social insurance and transfer income, and subtracts tax liabilities 
(and adds in tax credits, for those whose net tax liability is negative). Taxes are imputed using 
TAXSIM.
12
 
For the data from the CNEF, we simply employ the constructed variables for household pre-
government income [i11101] (which represents the combined income before taxes and 
government transfers of the head, partner, and other family members) and household post-
government income [i11102] (the combined income after taxes and government transfers of the 
head, partner, and other family members). 
SILC contains detailed income data. Market income is the sum of [py010g] “employee cash 
or near cash income”, [py050g] “cash benefits or losses from self-employment”, [hy040g] 
“income from rental of a property or land”, and [hy090g] “interest, dividends, profit from capital 
investments in unincorporated business”. To calculate disposable income, we add transfer 
income ([py090g] unemployment benefits, [py100g] old-age benefits, [py110g] survivor 
benefits, [py120g] sickness benefits, [py130g] disability benefits, [py140g] education-related 
allowances, [hy050g] family/children related allowances, [hy060g] periodic payments to people 
with insufficient resources, referred to as benefits to reduce “social exclusion not elsewhere 
classified”, [hy070g] housing allowances, [hy080g] regular inter-household cash transfer 
received, and [hy110g] income received by people aged under 16). We deduct taxes and alimony 
payments ([hy120g] regular taxes on wealth, [hy130g] regular inter-household cash transfer paid, 
                                                
11
  We employ the OECD-modified equivalence scale, which assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to 
each additional adult member (15 years or older) and of 0.3 to each child (Haagenars et al. 1994). See for 
example Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins (1992) and Cowell and Jenkins (1995) on equivalence scales; we find that 
various alternative family size adjustments alter results very little. 
12
  Version 9 at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim (see, also, Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). 
 10 
[hy140g] tax on income and social contributions). Person-level variables are aggregated to the 
household level. 
Top-coded income could represent a major threat to these de-compositions, since the GE2 
index emphasises variation in larger incomes (whereas a 90/10 ratio would be largely immune to 
this threat); however, empirically, it does not appear to be a large issue (Nichols 2008). 
Therefore, and for the sake of comparability, we top- and bottom-code our equivalised gross and 
net family incomes at p1 and p99, respectively. 
A longer period T is desirable for better estimates of the volatility component, but clearly if 
we wish to measure trends, a shorter period is preferable (so that we may compute more 
estimates across periods of length T). Note that T must be at least 3 for each individual in order 
for that individual’s observations to be used, and we will use T=3 and T=5 in this paper. 
To address the problem of panel attrition over time, we use the first year panel weights 
(adjusting for attrition from the survey up to that point) and calculate an adjustment factor to 
differentially adjust weights by 1/(1-p) where p is the estimated probability of attrition from a 
logit of attrition on initial income quintile dummies; logit regressions using more characteristics 
to predict the probability of attrition produce qualitatively similar results. 
Another concern is that the variance of the idiosyncratic error term used to characterise 
volatility also captures measurement error, but this is, in a deep sense, inevitable - one cannot 
observe short-run variation in income and know whether it represents true short-run variation in 
income or mis-reported or mis-measured income. This applies even to administrative earning 
records or to datasets with merged administrative records and survey responses (which we have 
for some countries in the SILC). The only approaches to estimate volatility and measurement 
error components separately require structural models of income distributions that can usually be 
rejected (in the statistical sense) by the very data used to fit them. To the extent that 
measurement error is increasing over time, any upward trend in volatility may represent 
increases in the volatility of true income, or increases in the volatility of measured income with 
no change in the volatility of true income. 
We engaged in several benchmarking exercises, to obtain a sense of how our income concepts 
compare to official data. We draw benchmark data from the OECD’s “Growing Unequal” report 
(OECD 2008) and other sources. Since it is often impossible to figure out how, exactly, the 
 11 
published results are calculated (in terms of exact income components, treatment of top- and 
bottom-codes and negative incomes treated, and the range of years to which the data refer), and 
since most of the official EU data are based upon the same data sets we use, the benchmarks are 
not much more than plausibility checks. 
But the results are very encouraging, as two figures in the Appendix demonstrate. The figures 
provide scatter-plots of Gini co-efficients published by the OECD vs. single-year Gini co-
efficients calculated by us, for 1995, 2000, and 2005. Note that the OECD data refer to ages 18-
65, while our estimates are for ages 25-60. Appendix Figure 1 displays net income data; 
Appendix Figure 2 displays gross income data. While there are some cases that are somewhat off 
the 45-degree line, there is a remarkably close overlap, especially for the net income data. 
5. Results 
Looking first at long-run inequality, the impact of accounting for taxes is readily apparent 
comparing gross (market) and net (disposable) income results for the US (Figure 1) and Canada 
(Figure 2). After-tax incomes are substantially less unequal, with long-run inequality index 
values about one third to two thirds as large as those for pretax incomes. This is to be expected, 
given the progressivity of the tax-transfer system. 
The pattern over time of the ratio of pre-tax inequality to after-tax multi-period inequality 
exhibits remarkable stability, at about 70 per cent in most years in the US and about 45 to 50 per 
cent in Canada, and is remarkably similar using different accounting periods of three and five 
years. Only in Korea and Switzerland is the ratio larger than in the US. Government intervention 
in these 3 countries does not reduce inequality by much. However, in most countries, the ratio of 
pre-government inequality to after-government multi-period inequality is lower than in Canada, 
suggesting that government intervention substantially reduces long-run inequality. 
The impact of accounting period T was also found to be modest relative to the differences 
across pre-tax and post-tax estimates of inequality in Nichols (2008), though there is a clear 
ordering, where longer accounting periods produce lower estimates of long-run inequality. This 
is to be expected, as Shorrocks (1978) and other scholars have noted, since there is some 
regression to the mean over time. 
 12 
The impact of taxes and transfers on estimated volatility and mobility risk is similar to the 
impact on inequality, with net income measures about 70 per cent of gross income measures in 
the US and about 60 per cent in Canada. Volatility estimates are roughly 50 per cent as large for 
post-government income as for pre-government income in most countries, though Cyprus, 
Switzerland, Korea, and Iceland exhibit higher ratios. In other words, taxes and transfers cut 
volatility roughly in half. The impact of government intervention on mobility risk estimates is 
nearly the same percentage reduction in estimated risk as in the volatility measure (roughly 
50%). Both reductions are most likely due to the progressivity of the tax and transfer systems. 
Overall, these estimates suggest that long-run inequality increased by about 50 per cent over 
the last 25 years in the US, but substantially less in Canada. Similarly, volatility risk appears to 
have increased by about 40 to 60 per cent and mobility risk by about 30 to 50 per cent over the 
same period in the US but much less in Canada. The aggregate risk measure, summing 
inequality, volatility, and mobility risk, has also increased by approximately 50 per cent over the 
last 25 years in the US. The aggregate measure is shown as a stacked area graph in Figure 3 for 
the US and Figure 4 for Canada. 
In the other 28 countries, the levels of long-run inequality, volatility, and mobility risk have 
increased only slightly in most cases (Figure 5), with most countries exhibiting a modest 
statistically significant upward trend or a statistically insignificant trend (including both 
downward and upward trends that do not differ significantly from no trend). However, looking at 
gross income (income before taxes and transfers), the difference between the US and other 
countries is much less clear; many countries have comparable rates of increase in gross income 
risks but much lower rates of increase in net income risks, which suggests that tax and transfer 
systems have done more in other countries to mitigate increases in gross income risk over time 
than it has in the US. 
The reductions in long-run inequality, volatility, and mobility risk due to the tax and transfer 
system, comparing a measure based upon gross (market) income to one based upon net 
(disposable) income, have changed over time, so we focus on mean levels of risk reduction in the 
following comparisons. 
The reductions in risk due to the tax and transfer system are highly related to the overall level, 
with a strong positive relationship between mean reduction in long-run inequality due to the tax-
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transfer system and mean long-run inequality (Figure 6) and a strong positive relationship 
between mean reduction in long-run volatility due to the tax-transfer system and mean long-run 
volatility (Figure 7). 
In addition, the relationship between mean reduction in long-run inequality and mean 
reduction in long-run volatility due to the tax-transfer system exhibits a clear positive 
relationship (Figure 8) but the US is a clear outlier, with modest reductions in long-run inequality 
but very large reductions in volatility when moving from gross to net income definitions. One 
would expect such a positive relationship from the Meltzer-Richard model – this preliminary 
result casts some doubts on the so-called “Robin Hood paradox” (Lindert 2004). However, these 
correlations are largely driven by mechanical relationships between level and reduction, and 
correlation of the level of inequality and volatility. Proportional reductions do not exhibit such a 
clear relationship, though there is a different mechanical bias introduced when dividing by the 
level (Borjas 1980). 
The regressivity of income growth within each three- or five-year period can be measured as 
the correlation or covariance of mean income ui (mean over five years) and individual-specific 
growth rates ri, as explained above (Figure 9). This is measured quite apart from the inequality, 
volatility, and mobility risk discussed in the previous section, though it is clearly related to trends 
in these measures; see Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) for additional relevant discussion of pro-
poor growth. We find that pro-poor growth is the exception – the correlation between income 
growth and income levels is negative only in France, Austria, and Italy. However, these findings 
have to be interpreted with some caution because our data cover different time-periods in 
different countries. 
Volatility, on the other hand, is strongly positively related to mean income (Figure 10). Since 
excess volatility tends to reduce welfare, the progressive incidence of high volatility has a 
somewhat equalising effect. In practice, presumably much of the higher volatility at higher mean 
income levels has to do with risky income sources producing higher mean returns; at any point in 
time, the richest individuals will tend to be realising high returns from a volatile income source. 
Some of it also reflects the increased risk tolerance that wealthier individuals may have if their 
basic needs are assuredly met, so they may gamble on stock market performance with the 
balance of their resources. 
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Straightforward extensions to the work which we have presented here include de-composing 
the inequality, volatility, and mobility measures by income type (Shorrocks 1982) or by 
population sub-group (Shorrocks 1984), but these are outside the scope of the current paper.
13
 
7. Conclusions 
The de-composition of variability in income across people and time undertaken here produces 
remarkably stable results across a variety of specifications. Calling total variability in incomes – 
measured as half the squared co-efficient of variation or GE2 – a measure of income risk, it can 
be expressed as the sum of long-run inequality (a measure of income risk from behind the veil of 
ignorance
14
), volatility or short-run fluctuations around a person-specific time trend, and 
variation in time trends or “mobility risk”. Other measures of the level of mobility are 
empirically broadly consistent with the measure we call mobility risk. 
All of the results indicate that long-run inequality is the dominant form of net income risk in 
these data. In most countries, all forms of net income risk seem fairly stable over time in the time 
periods examined. However, in the US, all forms of net income risk appear to be increasing 
sharply over time, and more modest growth in risk is observed in Canada and Germany. Other 
countries do not have sufficient data to conclude much about trends, but there is not even 
suggestive evidence that other countries have experienced the enormous run-up in net income 
risk that the US has. The differences are not so stark when examining gross income risk, which 
suggests that the tax and transfer system of the US has done less to mitigate the increases in 
gross income risk than other countries’ systems have done. 
                                                
13
  We plan to examine the impact of changing population characteristics in a future paper, and to examine the 
specific features of tax-transfer systems that drive the observed differences further. 
14
  On the veil of ignorance, see Harsanyi (1953,1955) and Rawls (1971). 
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Figure 2. Canadian Long-run inequality 
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Figure 3. US stacked inequality and intertemporal variability and mobility risk 
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Figure 4. Canadian stacked inequality and intertemporal variability and mobility risk 
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Figure 5. Stacked inequality and intertemporal variability and mobility risk in 30 countries, net income after taxes and transfers 
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Figure 6. Stacked inequality and intertemporal variability and mobility risk in 30 countries, gross income before taxes and transfers 
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 Figure 7. Reduction in intertemporal variability due to taxes and transfers versus reduction in long-run 
inequality in 30 countries 
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Figure 8. Reduction versus level of intertemporal variability in 30 countries 
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 Figure 9. Reduction versus level of long-run inequality in 30 countries 
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Figure 10. Mean correlation of income levels and growth rates in 30 countries 
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 Appendix. Benchmarking to published estimates 
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